We consider the problem of producing an impure public good in various jurisdictions formed through the strategic decisions of agents. Our environment inherits two well-known problems:
Introduction
We consider a society confronted to the problem of producing a public good through the private contributions of its members. The public good is impure, i.e., exhibits negative crowding e¤ect. As a result, a coalition of agents may have the incentive of splitting, so as to form a jurisdiction that produces its own local public good which cannot be consumed by outsiders. It is thus possible to observe a partition of the society-to which we refer as a jurisdiction structure-where each jurisdiction produces the public good locally. We address the relationship between the stability and e¢ ciency of jurisdiction structures.
The problem we pose belongs to the theory of local public goods that goes back to Tiebout (1956) who suggests that agents reveal their preferences through their choice of jurisdictions, thus ensuring that "equilibrium"jurisdiction structures are Pareto optimal. This claim is stated in an informal setting, hence cannot be formally falsi…ed. Nevertheless, the literature following Tiebout (1956) is quite rich in presenting cases against the e¢ ciency of "equilibrium"jurisdiction structures. 1 The de…nition of e¢ ciency being rather standard, it is the meaning attributed to "equilibrium" that is critical in determining the relation between the two concepts. A standard equilibrium notion -which is usually called freemobility equilibrium-is the immunity requirement against individual deviations. This is quite a weak requirement which may end up in ine¢ cient jurisdiction structures.
2 An extreme strengthening of free-mobility equilibria is the immunity requirement against coalitional deviations. This is what Greenberg and Weber (1986) call strong Tiebout equilibrium.
3 Although strong Tiebout equilibria are typically e¢ cient, the strength of the notion results in its possible failure to exist. 4 As a solution to this trade-o¤, Conley and Konishi (2002) propose migration-proof Tiebout equilibrium as a solution concept whose strenght lies between free mobility and strong Tiebout equilibria. They show for su¢ ciently large economies with homogeneous agents that a migration-proof Tiebout equilibrium uniquely exists and it is asymptotically e¢ cient.
The solution we propose has a di¤erent perspective: We explore the e¤ects of introducing membership property rights so that a move between jurisdictions may require the consent of agents who are not directly involved in that move. 1 As a famous example in this direction, we have the critique of Bewley (1981) who shows that equilibrium district structures may fail to exist or be ine¢ cient.
2 Buchanan and Goetz (1972) and Flatters et al. (1974) are among the …rst to point to the possible ine¢ ciency of free-mobility equilibria. The literature contains many explorations about this particular equilibrium concept, among which we have Richter (1982) , Greenberg (1983) , Konishi (1996) and Konishi et al. (1998) . 3 The idea of being immune to coalitional deviations has been previously used by McGuire (1974) and Wooders (1978) . 4 Guesnerie and Oddou (1981) and Greenberg and Weber (1986, 1993) discuss the existence conditions of strong Tiebout equilibria. The existence of coalitionally stable partitions in an abstract hedonic setting is addressed by Banerjee et al. (2001) , Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002) . 5 We owe this concept to Sertel (1992) whose formulation in an abstract setting has been worked on by Eren (1993) and further treated in detail by Sertel (1998 Sertel ( , 2003 . The concept has A membership property rights code assigns to each move, the list of agents whose approval is necessary for that move to occur. Thus, the stability of a jurisdiction structure depends on the used equilibrium concept as well as the membership property right code. This raises an interesting economic design problem which is the subject matter of this paper: Can the membership property right code be set so that the tension between stability and e¢ ciency vanishes?
In Section 2, we introduce the model. Our environment allows any …nite society with heterogeneous agents -hence being less restrictive than the one conceived by Conley and Konishi (2002) . We assume that the public good level within a jurisdiction is determined by the voluntary contributions of the jurisdiction members.
6 Each jurisdiction consumes its own public good -thus our model is also associated with the non-cooperative theory of coalition formation where coalitions are hedonic.
7 Section 3 collects the results under free mobility equilibria. These are rather negative. As an unsurprising fact, when individuals can freely exit from and enter to jurisdictions, neither stable jurisdiction structures have to be e¢ cient, nor e¢ cient ones are necessarily stable. In fact, as a stronger observation, there are economies where stable and e¢ cient jurisdiction structures form disjoint sets. This tension between stability and e¢ ciency can be partially relaxed through the introduction of membership property rights. Under approved entry 8 and approved exit 9 , every e¢ cient jurisdiction structure is stable. Nevertheless, the existence of stable but ine¢ cient jurisdiction structures prevails. In Section 4, we allow for coalitional moves. Unsurprisingly, coalitionally stable jurisdiction structures are always e¢ cient but they may fail to exist. However, by an appropriate choice of the membership property right code, one can ensure the coalitional stability of e¢ cient jurisdiction structures. More precisely, under approved entry and approved exit, coalitionally stable and e¢ cient jurisdiction structures coincide -hence rehabilitating the Tiebout (1956) hypothesis. Section 5 makes some closing remarks. been applied to more structured frameworks, such as the worker-partnership model proposed by Sertel (1982) ; the pure public good production problem analyzed by Asan and Sanver (2003) and the coalition formation analysis of Ozkal-Sanver (2005) , Nizamogullari and Ozkal-Sanver (2007) in matching problems. 6 Bergstrom et al. (1986) give a detailed analysis of the voluntary contributions solution (VCS) which is well-known to pave the way to ine¢ cient allocations. Our choice of VCS as the prevailing allocation rule is rather arbitrary. It can be justi…ed by assuming the nonexistence of institutions which implement e¢ cient allocation rules. After all, our interest is not towards the e¢ ciency of the considered public good allocation rule, but towards the e¢ ciency of institutions leading to jurisdiction formations under a given allocation rule. Moreover, we conjecture that our results prevail under any allocation rule which satis…es the population monotonicity condition used by Sertel and Yildiz (1998) . 7 We owe this terminology to Drèze and Greenberg (1980) who call the dependence of an agent's payo¤ to only the members of his coalition the "hedonic aspect". A thorough analysis of hedonic coalition structures is made by Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002) . 8 i.e., the entrance to a jurisdiction requires the consent of all members of that jurisdiction. 9 i.e., the exit from a jurisdiction requires the consent of all members of that jurisdiction.
2 The Model
Basic notions
We pick an integer n 2 and consider a society N = f1; : : : ; ng, confronted to the problem of providing an (impure) public good by the private contributions of its agents. The economy consists of a single public and a single private good. While all agents consume the same amount of public good y 2 < + , we write x i 2 < + for the amount of private good allocated to agent i 2 N . Agents have preferences over the private good-public good bundles they consume, as well as the number of agents with whom they share the public good. So every i 2 N has a real-valued utility function u i (x i ; y; k) where (x i ; y) 2 < + < + is an allocation and k 2 f1; :::; ng is the number of agents simultaneously consuming y. We write U for the set of such utility functions which satisfy the following two conditions: (i) Fixing any k 2 f1; :::; ng, u i (x i ; y; k) is continuous, monotonically increasing and strictly quasi-concave with respect to (x i ; y).
(ii) Fixing any (x i ; y) 2 < + < + , u i (x i ; y; k) is non-increasing in k.
Every i 2 N is endowed by zero public good and a strictly positive amount of private good denoted by ! i . Thus each i 2 N is characterized by an ordered pair (! i ; u i ) 2 < ++ U . The family e = f(! i ; u i )g i2N of such ordered pairs is an economy and E is the set of all economies where both the private and public good are normal.
Production of the public good
At any e 2 E, the public good level equals the total amount of private good contributions. So denoting t i the private good contribution of i 2 N , we have
We assume that a non-empty coalition K N of agents may come together to produce and consume their own public good, isolated from the rest of the society. We refer to such a coalition as a jurisdiction. Any jurisdiction K produces its own public good by the voluntary contributions of its members, which results in a game K = f( i ; p i )g i2K where i = [0; ! i ] is the strategy space of i 2 K. The joint strategy space of K is denoted as = Y i2K i and any i 2 K has a preference over represented by the real valued function p i : ! <, de…ned for any t 2 as
where T i = X j2N nfig t j denotes the total contributions of the agents other than i. For any K N , let V (K) = (x 1 ; :::; x #K ; y ) 2 < N + < + be the allocation induced by the Nash equilibrium vector (t 1 ; :::; t #K ) 2 of the game K such that y = X j2N t j and x i = ! i t i 8i 2 K. We call V (K) the voluntary contributions allocation of the jurisdiction K. 10 We write V i (K) = (x i ; y ; #K) for the outcome enjoyed by i 2 K, a result of the voluntary contributions allocation.
Formation of jurisdictions: Individual moves
We let (K) stand the set of all possible partitions of K 2 2 N nf;g. 11 We simplify notation by writing instead of (N ). Any 2 is called a jurisdiction structure (of the society). At each 2 , agents belonging to the same jurisdiction K 2 produce their own public good, consumed only by themselves. So each i 2 N has a preference over represented by a real-valued utility function
where (i) 2 stands for the jurisdiction to which agent i belongs in the jurisdiction structure .
For any K; L N and any i 2 N , we introduce a function F i;K;L : ! which is de…ned for each 2 as follows:
So F i;K;L ( ) is the jurisdiction structure obtained from by the move of agent i from jurisdiction K to jurisdiction L. Remark that de…ning such a move makes sense only if i 2 K and otherwise we let F i;K;L ( ) = . On the other hand L = ? is allowed, as i can move to an "empty jurisdiction". However,
But who has the right to accept or refuse such moves? Following Sertel (2003) , for each possible individual move, we de…ne a "code", which is the list of agents who must be consulted for this move to take place: Given any K 2 2 N nf;g, any i 2 K and any L 2 2 N with K \ L = ?, we write C i;K;L N for the set of agents who must be consulted when agent i wants to leave jurisdiction K and enter the (possibly empty) jurisdiction L. The family C = fC i;K;L g is the membership property right code of the society. We explicitly de…ne C under four membership property right axioms: For each K; L N with K \ L = ? and each i 2 K, we have Bergstrom et al. (1986) show that this will be unique in our assumed environment. From now on we let E be the set of economies (with normal private and public goods) where any K N leads to a voluntary contributions allocation V (K) with y > 0, i.e., there is at least one agent who contributes to the public budget.
1 1 A partition of K is a …nite family fKtg of pairwise disjoint subsets of K such that S Kt = K. While the usual de…nition requires each Kt to be non-empty, we relax the de…nition by treating the partitions fKtg and fKtg [ f;g equivalently.
Free Entry -Approved Exit
A jurisdiction structure 2 is said to be individually stable under a membership property right code C i¤ for any i 2 N and any
Under FE-FX, the existence of individually stable partitions is not guaranteed over E. To see this, for any positive real number r, let (r) + (resp., (r) ) stand for some real number higher (resp. lower) than but "su¢ ciently close to" r. Now take N = f1; 2g and let e 2 E be such that ! i = 1 8i 2 N , u 1 (x 1 ; y; k) = x 1 ; y for k 2 f1; 2g while u 2 (x 2 ; y; 1) = x 2 :y and u 2 (x 2 ; y; 2) = x2:y ( 
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Remark 2.1 Extending the list of agents who must be consulted for the move of some i 2 N from a jurisdiction K to a jurisdiction L has an enlarging e¤ ect on the set of stable jurisdiction structures. In other words, given any two membership property right codes C and C 0 where
and for all i 2 K, the stability of 2 under C implies the stability of under C 0 .
Formation of jurisdictions: Coalitional moves
Given any 2 , any non-empty S N and any 2 (S), the move of S is the jurisdiction structure F S; ( ) = fT nS 2 2 N : T 2 g [ . 13 So all members of S leave their jurisdiction at , they partition according to and each S 0 2 moves to an "empty jurisdiction". Remark that coalitional moves generalize individual moves. It is clear that the (individual) move of i 2 N from (i) to the empty jurisdiction corresponds to the move of fig where trivially = ffigg. In a similar vein, the move of i from (i) to L 2 is equivalent to the move of L [ fig where = fL [ figg. We say that S blocks 2 i¤ there exists 2 (S) such that v i (F S; ( )) v i ( ) 8i 2 S while v i (F S; ( )) > v i ( ) for some i 2 S. Any move of a coalition S is subject to the approval of those agents speci…ed by the membership property right code C = fC i;K;L g where again C i;K;L N is the set of agents who must be consulted when agent i 2 K wants to leave jurisdiction K to enter 1 2 Individual stability of 2 under FE-FX is equivalent to the free mobility equilibrium as de…ned in Conley and Konishi (2002) . Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002) identify, in a general hedonic setting, conditions that ensure the existence of individually stable partitions. Note that individual stability under FE-FX (resp, AE-FX, AE-AX) is called Nash stability (resp., individual stability, contractual individual stability) by Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002) . 1 3 T nS is empty when T S. This violates the usual de…nition of a partition. However, as noted in Footnote 11, we allow partitions to include the empty-set. jurisdiction L. Nevertheless, under our de…nition of a coalitional move, L is always empty. So for coalitional moves, it is fC i;K;; g which matters.
A jurisdiction structure 2 is said to be coalitionally stable under a membership property right code C i¤ (i) For any S 2 2 N nf;g which blocks by some move, there exists i 2 S such that v j ( ) > v j (F S; ( )) for some j 2 ( (i)nS) \ C i; (i);; and (ii) 2 is individually stable under C.
3 Results: Individual Stability
We start by recalling the case where the public good exhibits no crowding e¤ect. Let E p E be the set of economies where the public good is pure, i.e., for every i 2 N and every (x i ; y) 2 < + < + , we have u i (x i ; y; k) = u i (x i ; y; k 0 ) 8k; k 0 2 f1; : : : ; ng: The following result is quoted from Asan and Sanver (2003):
Theorem 3.1 Let the membership property right code be determined by FE-FX.
At every e 2 E p , there exists a unique individually stable jurisdiction structure as well as a unique e¢ cient 15 jurisdiction structure which is fN g.
So under the absence of crowding e¤ects, the jurisdiction structure fN gto which we refer as the grand jurisdiction-is e¢ cient and individually stable, independent of the economy. Hence, we have a counterpart of the …rst theorem of welfare economics (every stable jurisdiction structure is e¢ cient) as well as of the second one (every e¢ cient jurisdiction structure is stable).
Remark 3.1 Remark 2.1 advices some caution about the fate of Theorem 3.1 when the membership property right code is tightened. As Asan and Sanver (2003) show, Theorem 3.1 remains intact when FE is replaced by AE. On the other hand, switching from FX to AX leads to new individually stable partitions, which ends up in individually stable but ine¢ cient jurisdiction structures -hence leading to a failure of the …rst welfare theorem.
The stability-e¢ ciency harmony announced by Theorem 3.1 is due to the absence of crowding e¤ects. Once we leave the world of pure public goods, there is no reason to expect the grand jurisdiction to be the only e¢ cient one, or even to be e¢ cient. 16 In fact, when the public good is impure, no jurisdiction 1 5 We say that 2 is e¢ cient i¤ there exists no 0 2 such that v i ( 0 ) v i ( ) 8i 2 N and v i ( 0 ) > v i ( ) for some i 2 N . Due to the …niteness of the society (hence the …niteness of the logically possible partitions), every e 2 E admits an e¢ cient jurisdiction structure.
1 6 The intuition behind this claim -which we will justify soon-is related to the seminal work of Buchanan (1965) is e¢ cient when e 2 E p . Now consider the case where is not the grand jurisdiction. Take any e 2 E such that ! i = ! j 8i; j 2 N while for each i 2 N we have
where M is a positive real number. Picking M su¢ ciently large, ensures the e¢ ciency of . To see (ii), consider …rst the case where is the grand jurisdiction. Take any e 2 E such that ! i = ! j 8i; j 2 N while for each i 2 N we have u i (x i ; y; k) = x i :y when k = 1 xi:y M when k > 1 where M is a positive real number. Picking M su¢ ciently large ensures that is not e¢ cient. Now consider the case where is not the grand jurisdiction. We know, by Theorem 3.1, that is not e¢ cient when e 2 E p . To see (iii), assume FE-FX. Consider …rst the case where is the grand jurisdiction which, by Theorem 3.1, is stable at any e 2 E p . Now consider the case where is not the grand jurisdiction. Take any e 2 E such that ! i = ! j 8i; j 2 N while for each i 2 N we have u i (x i ; y; k) = x i :y when k # (i)
where M is a positive real number. Picking M su¢ ciently large ensures the stability of . To see (iv), assume FE-FX. Consider …rst the case where = ffig : i 2 N g which, by Theorem 3.1, fails to be stable at any e 2 E p . Consider now the case where di¤ers from ffig : i 2 N g. Take any e 2 E such that ! i = ! j 8i; j 2 N while for each i 2 N we have u i (x i ; y; k) = x i :y when k = 1
where M is a positive real number. Picking M su¢ ciently large ensures that is not stable.
Remark 3.2 Theorem 3.2 remains intact when we switch from FE to AE or from FX to AX. The e¢ ciency of a jurisdiction structure does not depend on the membership property right code -hence parts (i) and (ii) prevail. The fact announced by Remark 2.1 ensures this for part (iii). To see this for part (iv), it su¢ ces to check that the non-stability exhibited by the examples used in the proof does not depend on the membership property right code.
Our next result announces the existence of economies where stable and e¢ -cient jurisdiction structures form disjoint sets -hence the failure of both welfare theorems:
Theorem 3.3 There exists e 2 E where under FE-FX, the (non-empty) sets of stable and e¢ cient jurisdiction structures are disjoint. according to which the set of e¢ cient jurisdiction structures is ffN nfig; figg : i 2 N g [ ffK; N nKg : #K = 2g while the grand jurisdiction is the only stable jurisdiction structure.
Remark 3.3 In the example that proves Theorem 3.3, switching to AE-FX renders the jurisdiction structures ffN nfig; figg : i 2 N g individually stable while switching to FE-AX renders the jurisdiction structures ffK; N nKg : #K = 2g individually stable. Under both switches, there remain stable partitions which are not e¢ cient and e¢ cient partitions which are not stable. So the welfare theorems fail to hold over E under AE-FX and FE-AX as well.
The next theorem shows that tightening the membership property right code further, recovers one of the welfare theorems.
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Theorem 3.4 Given any e 2 E, under AE-AX, e¢ cient jurisdiction structures are individually stable. However, there exists e 2 E where, under AE-AX, individually stable jurisdiction structures are not e¢ cient.
Proof. Take any e 2 E and let AE-AX be the membership property right code. Take any 2 which is not individually stable. So there exists i 2 N and
Hence, is not e¢ cient, as it is Pareto dominated by F i; (i);K ( ). The existence of economies where, under AE-AX, stable jurisdiction structures are not e¢ cient, follows from the conjunction of Remark 2.1 with Theorem 3.3 which establishes the existence of such economies under FE-FX.
It is worth noting that the examples we use to show our results exhibit a particular "convexity"structure. We say that the preference u i (x i ; y; k) of i 2 N is crowding-convex i¤ given any (x i ; y) 2 < + < + and any k 1 ; k 2 2 f1; : : : ; n 1g with k 1 > k 2 , we have u i (x i ; y; k 1 + 1) u i (x i ; y; k 1 ) u i (x i ; y; k 2 + 1) u i (x i ; y; k 2 ). We write E convex E for the set of economies where individual preferences are crowding-convex.
In fact, the proofs of Theorems 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 use economies with crowdingconvex preferences -hence all four theorems can be stated by replacing E with E convex . 18 However, the failure of the welfare theorems is not due to crowding-convexity. To see this, we de…ne the corresponding "concavity" condition and say that the preference u i (x i ; y; k) of i 2 N is crowding-concave i¤ given any (x i ; y) 2 < + < + and any k 1 ; k 2 2 f1; : : : ; n 1g with k 1 > k 2 , we have u i (x i ; y; k 1 + 1) u i (x i ; y; k 1 ) u i (x i ; y; k 2 + 1) u i (x i ; y; k 2 ). We write E concave E for the set of economies where individual preferences are crowding-concave.
Theorem 3.5 There exists e 2 E concave where under FE-FX -hence also under tighter membership property right codes-stable jurisdiction structures are not e¢ cient.
Proof. Consider e 2 E where N = f1; 2; 3g and ! i = 1 8i 2 N . Letting c 1 = ( for each i 2 f1; 2g and u 3 (x 3 ; y; k) = x 3 :y for all k 2 f1; 2; 3g. So e 2 E concave . One can check that this implies for each 2 and each i 2 f1; 2g, v i ( ) = 1 4 when # (i) = 1 ( 1 4 ) when # (i) 2 while 1 8 As a matter of fact, the economies in the proof of Theorem 3.2 do not …t the de…nition of crowding-convexity. However, they can easily be rendered crowding-convex (by making M increase with the number of agents within a coalition) without harming the results they establish. according to which all jurisdiction structures but ff1; 2g; f3gg are e¢ cient. On the other hand, under FE-FX all jurisdiction structures; under AE-FX all jurisdiction structures but ff1g; f2g; f3gg; under FE-AX ff1g; f2g; f3gg and ff1; 2g; f3gg fail stability.
Results: Coalitional Stability
We …rst remark the e¢ ciency of coalitionally stable jurisdiction structuresindependent of the membership property right code.
Remark 4.1 Under any C = fC i;K;L g, a jurisdiction structure 2 which is not e¢ cient, fails coalitional stability as N blocks by a move where Pareto dominates while ( (i)nN ) \ C i; (i);; = ; for all i 2 N . However the existence of coalitionally stable jurisdiction structures depends on C. For example, we know through the example given in Section 2.3 that, under FE-FX, individually stable (hence coalitionally stable) jurisdiction structures may fail to exist. Nevertheless, as we show below, when the membership property right code is tightened to AE-AX, every e¢ cient jurisdiction structure is coalitionally stable. This ensures the existence of coalitionally stable jurisdiction structures, as e¢ cient jurisdiction structures always exist.
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Theorem 4.1 Let C = fC i;K;L g be determined by AE-AX. Take any e 2 E. Every e¢ cient jurisdiction structure 2 is coalitionally stable.
Proof. Let C = fC i;K;L g be determined by AE-AX. Take any e 2 E and any 2 which is not coalitionally stable. If is not individually stable, then fails e¢ ciency by Theorem 3.4. Now let be individually stable. So there exist S 2 2 N nf;g and 2 (S) such that v i (F S; ( )) v i ( ) 8i 2 S while v i (F S; ( )) > v i ( ) for some i 2 S. Moreover, given any i 2 S, we have v j (F S; ( )) v j ( ) 8j 2 ( (i)nS) \ C i; (i);; . Finally, v j (F S; ( )) = v j ( ) 8j 2 N n S i2S (i). Hence, is not e¢ cient, as it is Pareto dominated by F S; ( ).
Remark 4.2 Theorem 4.1 fails to hold under AE-FX or FE-AX, as we know, from Remark 3.2, that these membership property right codes admit e¢ cient jurisdiction structures which fail individual stability, hence coalitional stability.
The conjunction of Remark 4.1 and Theorem 4.1 leads to the following corollary:
Corollary 4.1 Let C = fC i;K;L g be determined by AE-AX. Take any e 2 E. A jurisdiction structure 2 is coalitionally stable if and only if is e¢ cient.
Closing Remarks

